



Understanding Pipeline Politics in Eurasia: Turkey’s Transit 
Security in Natural Gas 
	
Abstract. As the importance of natural gas for the energy future of the European Union rises, many new 
pipeline projects are proposed to transfer rich resources of Eurasia towards Europe. Why do some of these 
projects succeed, and others fail? To explain this phenomenon, the energy security literature has focused 
mostly on the security of energy supply and demand, while the specific challenges faced by transit states 
attracted relatively less attention. This paper focuses on the reasons that make pipeline politics and 
economics controversial and challenging by introducing and operationalizing the concept of transit 
security. It defines transit security broadly where transit countries are sensible to changes in supply and 
demand in addition to pipeline-specific issues, which are determined by a combination of economic and 
geopolitical factors. It argues that in the case of Turkey, transit security is influenced by asymmetries in 
trade dependence and political power in addition to prospect of future rents from transit. The last section 
applies this framework to Eurasian gas transit in order to explain the success and failure of past, present, 
and future pipelines.  
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In the last two decades, producers and consumers of hydrocarbons proposed numerous 
pipeline projects to transport rich natural gas resources of Eurasia to Europe. While some 
of these projects (e.g. TANAP and Nord Stream) were successfully concluded, others (e.g. 
South Stream and Nabucco) have famously failed. This paper focuses on the reasons that 
make pipeline politics and economics controversial and challenging by focusing on the 
concept of transit security. The energy security literature has traditionally focused on the 
security of supply and demand, while transit countries were studied mostly in relation to 
their problematic relations with exporters and their critical importance for the security of 
importers. This paper shifts the focus exclusively to transit countries with the particular 
aim of introducing and operationalizing transit security.  
Based on a detailed case study of Turkey’s natural gas transit in addition to 
insights from other proposed or existing pipelines in Eurasia, the paper reveals that transit 
countries are sensible to changes in supply and demand in addition to pipeline-specific 




three components of transit security (supply security, demand security, and pipelines) are 
ultimately influenced by asymmetries in trade dependence and political power vis-à-vis 
consumers and producers. In other words, transit countries that have more economic and 
political leverage over producers and consumers will also have more transit security, 
which would allow them to maintain (or increase) their transit levels and associated 
financial compensation. In addition to these systemic variables, domestic economic 
interests, particularly the prospect of rents, also impact transit security in relation to 
existing and planned pipeline projects.   
Transit countries and natural gas pipelines are essential components of the global 
energy system as they play a crucial role in sustaining the energy demand throughout the 
world. They also serve as a buffer zone between energy-rich and energy-poor countries 
that aim to diversify their markets and energy sources respectively. This essay contributes 
to an emerging literature on energy transit countries, yet it is the first of its kind to define 
and operationalize the concept of transit security in the context of Eurasian natural gas 
pipelines. Understanding transit security not only makes an important contribution to the 
literature on energy security by broadening its focus and opening up a new research 
agenda, but it also helps explain the factors that lead to either cooperation or conflict in 
international relations. As such the concept will serve as a policy guide not only for 
transit countries, but also for all importers and exporters of energy.  
Below, I first review the literature on energy security, discuss its relevance for 
transit countries, and define transit security. Next, I focus on Turkey as an upcoming 




and failed natural gas pipeline projects as case studies.1 The final section applies the 
concept of transit security to other pipeline projects in Eurasia.  
Energy Security and Transit  
 
Energy security is often a vital matter for all governments due to the crucial role of 
hydrocarbons in the functioning of modern economies and, more broadly, of societies. In 
this context, securing stable energy supplies is a major strategic challenge for all 
countries. Yet, despite its importance, energy security remains an elusive concept.  
Energy security has been synonymous with security of supply for a long time 
since the Second World War, reflecting the chronic energy dependence of many 
industrialized nations in the West (Kruyt, van Vuuren, De Vries, & Groenenberg, 2009). 
For the United States, for example, energy security has, until recently, been a reaction to 
an unwelcome dependence on external suppliers (Winzer, 2012). Understood in this way, 
energy security implies securing access to limited supplies around the world at affordable 
prices (Cherp & Jewell, 2014; Jansen, Arkel, & Boots, 2004; Kruyt et al., 2009). 
Nevertheless, energy security is no longer equivalent to supply security. The energy 
regime of the twenty-first century includes global markets, a massive infrastructure 
network of upstream, midstream, and downstream activities and a growing 
interdependence of buyers and sellers in a global market (Chester, 2010). As such, energy 
ssecurity covers a broad range of actors, institutions, and processes from producer to final 
consumer (Bielecki, 2002; IEA, 2017).  
																																																								
1	The paper draws upon in-depth interviews by the author with officials from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 




In this complex background, it is difficult to find a common definition that can 
incorporate diverging interests of countries, which may have different interpretations of 
energy security (Chester, 2010; Kruyt et al., 2009; Winzer, 2012). Energy exporters, for 
instance, focus on acquiring market access and avoiding sudden price drops, while 
worrying about competition from other potential suppliers (Bahgat, 2013). For 
developing countries such as Ukraine and Turkey, energy security is closely related to the 
cost of energy, and its impact on their balance of payments. For China and India, energy 
security has signified a rapid adaptation to their dependence on world markets, while 
making sure that pollution levels are kept in check. In Japan nuclear power and safety is 
an issue, while in Brazil, rights of indigenous people and corruption are major concerns 
(Sovacool & Saunders, 2014; Yergin, 2006).  
These variations among countries underline a need to further broaden the concept 
of energy security to account for changing patterns in global energy trade, supply chain 
vulnerabilities, and the integration of new major economies into the global market 
(Yergin, 2006). Particularly, the unique nature of transit countries, which represent the 
interests of both the producers and consumers as well as having their own agenda, has 
often been overlooked in the literature and deserves further attention. 
Energy transit is primarily an economic phenomenon. Accordingly, economic 
approaches to understanding transit relations have focused on issues such as externalities 
caused by transit states (Yegorov & Wirl, 2009), dual pricing (Tarr & Thomson, 2004), 
relative bargaining power of suppliers and transit countries (Omonbude, 2007), and 
analysis of gas contracts (Pirani, 2009). While these studies have substantial value in 




all the actors involved and a matter of both national and international security (Heinrich, 
2018).  
The academic literature on energy security has traditionally focused on 
diversification as a key concept (Yergin, 2006) Diversification is useful as it presents 
alternatives, prevents monopolies, and serves the interests of consumers and producers. 
Transit countries feature in this literature mainly in relation to how they can contribute to 
diversification of either supply or demand. Studies often focus on the problematic 
relations of transit countries with producers and their critical importance for European 
energy security (Bilgin, 2009; Kovacevic, 2009; Kropatcheva, 2011; Ruseckas, 2000; 
Yafimava, 2011).  
In addition, a number of comparative studies focus on key transit countries such 
as Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, or Turkey (Balmaceda, 2006, 2007, 2013; Bilgin, 2010; 
Fink, 2006; Opitz & von Hirschhausen, 2001; Yafimava, 2011). These studies help 
evaluate domestic interests and geopolitical constraints that affect energy policies of 
transit states. Yet, the literature still lacks a definition of transit security that 
conceptualizes economic, domestic, and security-related implications of being a transit 
country.  
In summary, the current conceptualization of energy security focuses primarily on 
availability, access and affordability (Kruyt et al., 2009). However, today’s energy 
relations could be best understood as a “system” with various actors with different 
priorities, different fears, and different opportunities in addition to “standard” concerns 
regarding guarantee of supply and demand (Cherp & Jewell, 2014; Jewell, Cherp, & 




sections focus on transit security as part of an effort to broaden the definition of energy 
security.  
Transit in Natural Gas 
 
The physical distance between the centers of production and consumption of oil and 
natural gas is one of the fundamental characteristics of contemporary global energy 
relations that necessitates transit (Yergin, 2011). Transit signifies a process where goods 
produced in one country are transferred through the territory of another one to be sold 
somewhere else (International Energy Charter, 2016). The nature of transit, particularly 
its technical feasibility and economic profitability, is strongly influenced by the 
materiality of energy resources (Balmaceda et al., 2019). Due to its lighter-than-air 
physical state, natural gas trade has traditionally had to rely on pipelines, which require 
compressor stations to make sure that adequate amounts of pressure is maintained 
(Balmaceda, 2018). In this sense, natural gas is quite different than crude oil, which is 
easier to transport via rail, trucks, and tankers. This could, however, change in the near 
future thanks to increasing availability of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), which is suitable 
for maritime trade. The share of LNG in global gas trade is expected to reach 40 percent 
by 2024 (IEA, 2018). Nevertheless, most natural gas importers today still have to ensure 
the security of their energy source over long distances through transit countries via 
transnational pipelines. 
 In natural gas markets, transit countries play a very important role especially in 
the Eurasian region, where vast distances separate producers and consumers (Energy 




to import terminals in Lithuania and Poland. In the long run this might reduce the 
strategic importance of pipeline transit from Russia by allowing Baltic and Eastern 
European countries to import from other sources such as the United States (Noack, 2018). 
However, the overwhelming majority of the natural gas trade in Eurasia still relies on 
pipelines and land transit (Shaffer, 2013; Stevens, 2009). As a consequence, geographical 
considerations and pipeline politics continue to influence natural gas transit in Eurasia.  
Is Transit in Eurasia a Curse?  
 
Eurasia is one of the key theatres of global natural gas trade. In 2018, Russia delivered 
approximately 200 Bcm (billion cubic meters) of gas to European countries with major 
importers being Germany, Turkey, Italy, the United Kingdom, and France (Gazprom 
Export, 2019). Overall, Russia supplies 35 percent of Europe’s total imports mostly via 
Ukraine and Belarus. Other transit states in the region include Bulgaria, Romania, 
Moldova, Georgia, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Poland, and Turkey. In the last two 
decades, transit conflicts featuring most of these countries appeared prominently in global 
news outlets. For example, Ukraine had three major disputes with Russia (2006, 2009, 
and 2014) concerning price negotiations, transit costs, unpaid fees, and unauthorized off-
take. These conflicts received significant attention since Ukrainian pipelines have 
traditionally supplied the majority of European Union’s (EU) gas imports.  
Belarus also had three major disputes with Russia (2004, 2007, and 2016) due to 
ownership disputes and disagreements over discounted prices (EurAsia Daily, 2017; 




2014, both Slovakia and Poland have seen their intake from Russia significantly reduced 
as a response to their reselling of Russian gas to Ukraine (Carney, 2014; DW, 2016).  
Why is gas transit in Eurasia so problematic? A simple answer is transit relations 
are complex. Successful transit requires reliable supply and demand, trustworthy transit 
countries, secure routes, realistic building costs, support from major powers, and 
reasonable transit fees. In this complex web of pipelines and countries, multiple problems 
may arise. Traditionally these issues are analyzed via the concepts of supply and demand 
security, which focus on themes such as guaranteed provisions, diversification, 
geopolitical conflict, and market access. Nevertheless, it should still be possible to clarify 
how energy security specifically relates to transit.  
The existence of a potential for both conflict and cooperation in transit reflects the 
Liberal versus Realist dichotomy in International Relations (IR). A Liberal perspective 
assumes that pipelines, as mediums of commerce, would make transit conflicts unlikely 
by creating mutual interests and incentives to maintain trade (Van de Graaf, Sovacool, 
Ghosh, Kern, & Klare, 2016). Subsequently, these shared interests make disruptions too 
costly (Mansfield & Pollins, 2009). Pipeline projects often involve public and private 
companies from exporting, importing, and transit countries. These investments and joint 
ownership deals thicken the relationship among these actors and create linkages and 
conflict resolution processes (Fettweis, 2009; Kahler & Kastner, 2006). 
There is some evidence in favor of the Liberal approach. In Eurasia, even if 
pipeline politics appear controversial, many European private companies closely 
cooperate with the Russian state-owned Gazprom, which has been a reliable supplier of 




gas exporter in the region, Azerbaijan has had very good relations with Georgia and 
Turkey, which transit the Caspian gas towards Europe. Existing and planned pipelines 
create mutual interests and dependencies where producers rely on revenues as much as 
consumers depend on natural gas.  
A liberal theory of IR is also concerned with how societal ideas, interests, and 
institutions can impact state behavior (Moravcsik, 1997). Domestic politics and 
institutions can indeed influence energy policies of transit states (Heinrich & Pleines, 
2015). In fact domestic interests are very useful in explaining policy variations among 
transit countries that face similar geopolitical constraints. Balmaceda (2013), for 
example, demonstrates how domestic economic groups in Ukraine and Belarus, 
prevented diversification away from Russian natural gas until late 2000s due to existence 
of high transit rents. In Lithuania, however, the relative scarcity of rents allowed the 
government to make limited progress towards diversification.  
In terms of international institutions, trade in natural gas is subject to similar 
regulations in international commerce. World Trade Organization (WTO) rules state that 
member countries have a right to transit through other members’ territories subject to 
reasonable charges (Willems & Sul, 2008). Similarly, the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) 
require signatories to “facilitate transit of energy, consistent with the principle of freedom 
of transit, and to secure established energy flows” (International Energy Charter, 2017). 
The treaty also prevents countries from disrupting existing transit flows even if they are 
in conflict regarding the terms of transit.  
Despite these expectations regarding mutual interests and incentives for 




maximize their own benefits at the expense of others. In contrast to Liberal 
Institutionalist focus on markets and institutions, Realists emphasize rival political and 
economic blocs that compete for resources and markets through the use of political, 
economic and military power (Correlje & Van der Linde, 2006), which is often 
demonstrated in what is called “pipeline politics”. These conflictual relationships are 
enabled by the lack of an overarching authority to manage transit affairs. Despite the 
above-mentioned ECT and WTO regulations, there is no international organization or 
treaty that specifically regulates energy and transit relations between two or more parties. 
Russia, a key natural gas exporter, has not ratified the ECT and the related transit 
protocol (Peters & Westphal, 2013). Furthermore, there is no standard international 
mechanism for conflict resolution in transit (Stevens, 2009). The parties to transit 
conflicts often seek international arbitration by independent sources and the findings of 
these arbitrations are legally non-binding (ESMAP, 2003).  
How to assess transit security in light of these complex interdependent 
relationships, which can be prone to conflict? This paper argues that a comprehensive 
treatment of transit security should go beyond the Realist vs. Liberal dichotomy to 
understand the conditions under which transit relations can become either cooperative or 
conflictual. It is true that economic interactions can often create incentives for domestic 
and international actors to push for cooperation; however, geopolitics can undermine this 
cooperation and cause instability (Shaffer, 2013). The next section will define transit 





Defining Transit Security   
 
Despite the geopolitical and economic importance of transit countries, transit security 
remains to be defined. A quick survey of energy strategies of transit states reveals the 
virtual non-existence of the concept as guidance for these countries. For example, 
Ukraine’s Energy Strategy 2035, a 37-page document, does not have a single reference to 
transit. Similarly, Turkey, a country aspiring to be a transit corridor, does not sketch out a 
specific definition of transit security in its 2015-2019 strategic energy plan (Ministry of 
Energy and Natural Resources, 2014). 
In the academic literature on energy security, one of the few definitions of transit 
security comes from Yafimava (2011, p. 17), who defines gas transit security as the 
“acceptable level of threat of supply and price disruption arising from risks associated 
with the transit of gas supplies”. She demonstrates how problems in Eurasian natural gas 
networks and the asymmetrical power relations between Russia and Eastern European 
countries adversely affect transit security. She also shows how contractual, governance-
related, political, and technical problems, or discontinuities, can overlap to undermine 
EU’s energy security. While her definition and analysis is valuable, as the title of book 
suggests, its primary focus is the “transit dimension of EU energy security” (Yafimava, 
2011). In fact, many discussions of transit security treat the concept as a sub-category of 
EU’s gas supply security (Energy Charter Secretariat, 2015).  
In this paper, I define transit security in natural gas broadly as the ability to 
maintain and increase continuous flow of natural gas, which is not intended for domestic 
consumption, through the borders in exchange for some form of financial compensation. 




security with producers of natural gas. After all, in the absence of a stable supply, less gas 
would flow and transit security would be negatively affected. The second component 
relates to consumers of natural gas. Again, in the absence of a strong demand, a country’s 
transit prospects would suffer. These two components highlight the fact that transit 
countries are heavily affected by the energy security concerns of both producers and 
consumers.  
Supply and demand security in relation to transit are fundamentally determined by 
diversification, or in other words, trade dependence (Shaffer, 2013). In transit relations, 
countries that heavily depend on the natural gas trade either as a source of energy, or as a 
source of revenue will be more vulnerable to threats and disruptions from less dependent 
countries. Meanwhile countries that have diverse options to either buy or sell natural gas 
would be more secure.    
The impact of asymmetrical trade dependence is best observed in Russia’s 
approach to many former Soviet Union and Eastern Block countries, where Moscow is 
the exclusive natural gas supplier. In this context, Russia’s increasing influence fueled by 
its hydrocarbons and its record of using pipeline politics to punish divergent behavior led 
to numerous conflicts with its neighbors (Vatansever, 2010; Yafimava, 2011). In many 
cases, Russia was willing to use its near monopoly over gas flows to Europe to punish 
non-cooperative transit states such as Ukraine (Stulberg, 2012).  
In contrast, the nature of the natural gas trade between Russia and the EU via 
Germany is a good example of an interdependent relationship where it is in the essential 
interests of both parties to maintain trade due to its relatively high volume for both sides 




and less disruptive transit relations after the completion of proposed Nord Stream II, 
compared to that between Russia and Ukraine. 
The third component of transit security differs from the previous two in the sense 
that it is specific to actual transit flows. It relates to current and future pipeline projects, 
which would strengthen a country’s transit status and help the country receive 
compensation for allowing transit. I expect this component to be mainly affected by 
economic interests (domestic and international) as well as the geopolitical context. 
Pipelines can be costly for all parties to transit; however, transit countries are more likely 
to support new pipeline projects if they create rents and contribute to more competitive 
prices. At the same time, pipeline politics are also affected by short-term geopolitical 
competition among major powers. Here, it is important to note that while the first two 
components (supply and demand) are geopolitical in essence, the third component also 
includes a role for domestic interests. The following section will apply this definition of 
transit security on Turkey. Turkey is a relatively new transit country in natural gas. 
However, its geographical location makes it a crucial bridge between energy-rich Eurasia 
and the European markets.  





As a developing country with a growing urban population Turkey’s energy demand has 
grown faster than any OECD country in the last fifteen years (MFA, 2018). Unable to 




security during in this period has been to secure external sources from neighboring 
countries to satisfy its growing thirst for energy.  
Natural gas has had a growing share in Turkey’s overall energy portfolio (Berk & 
Ediger, 2018). BOTAŞ, the state owned Petroleum Pipeline Company, predicts that the 
demand for natural gas will increase by an average of 2.3 percent from 2014 until 2030, 
from 48 Bcm to 70 Bcm (Austvik & Rzayeva, 2016). At the moment, four pipelines from 
Russia, Iran and Azerbaijan serve 83 percent of Turkey’s natural gas demand. These are 
Blue Stream and West Line (Trans-Balkan Pipeline) from Russia, East Line (Tabriz-
Doğubayazıt) pipeline from Iran and the South Caucuses Pipeline (SCP) from Azerbaijan 
via Georgia (EIA, 2016). In addition to these pipelines, Turkey-Greece pipeline connects 
the gas grids of both countries and allows the transport of Azerbaijani, Russian and 
Iranian gas to Greece. The rest of Turkey’s natural gas demand is covered by LNG 
imports (Rzayeva, 2018).  
Turkey’s primary objective as a consumer is to ensure sustainable, high quality, 
and cheap supplies for its growing demand for gas. For that, Turkey is ideally located in 
close proximity to world’s richest gas resources. Especially, in the last decade, Turkish 
government began to take advantage of this proximity to carry out an active energy 
policy, which included new pipeline projects not only to satisfy growing domestic 
demand, but also to diversify supply and to become a transit hub for natural gas (Babali, 
2012; MFA, 2018)2 3  
																																																								
2 Interview with Ercan Kılınçkıran. Branch Manager, The Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources. 
Ankara. 15 June 2015. Interview with Aslin Savran. Chief Clerk, Energy, Water, and Environmental 
Affairs. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Ankara. 26 June 2015 
3	Analyses estimate that Turkey can facilitate the transit of up to 100 BCM per year if the relevant 




Two recent projects serve this purpose. The first will bring more Azerbaijani gas 
to Turkey and Europe as part of the Southern Gas Corridor by first expanding of the 
capacity of the existing South Caucasus Pipeline. Subsequently, the newly built Trans-
Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP), which has a capacity of 16 Bcm would carry gas from the 
South Caucasus Pipeline towards Turkey’s western border (DW, 2018). At the moment, 
10 Bcm is reserved for European gas markets while the rest will be used for Turkish 
domestic consumption (Fırat, 2016). Finally, the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) will 
connect with TANAP to serve Italy and Southeast Europe (Ministry of Energy and 
Natural Resources, 2018).  
The second project is the TurkStream. Two adjacent pipelines from Russia will 
supply Turkey and southeast Europe via the Black Sea, replacing gas coming from Trans-
Balkan pipeline via Ukraine. The first pipeline to feed domestic consumers is now 
complete, and the construction of the second pipeline is expected to begin soon. Two 
pipelines are expected to have 31.5 billion cubic meters per year (Bcm/y) of gas (Ahval, 
2018; Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, 2018). These existing gas pipelines and 
upcoming projects will allow Turkey to create a Southern Gas Corridor in the near future 
(Berk & Schulte, 2017; Üçok, 2014), which would make the issue of transit security a 
key priority for Ankara.   
Turkey’s Transit Security  
 
In consistent with the definition of transit security detailed above, I expect Turkey’s 
transit security to be conditioned by security of supply and demand as well as particular 




transit natural gas depends on its capability to not only secure enough supplies to satisfy 
domestic demand, but also have additional capacity for transit without becoming 
dependent on one source. Secondly, changes in quantity of gas demanded can influence 
Turkey’s transit prospects. In particular, Turkey’s transit security depends on the stability 
of the European demand and the EU countries’ willingness to diversify. Finally, pipeline 
politics have specific dynamics that distinguish them from both supply and demand 
security. These components are analyzed next. 
Turkey’s Supply Security in Relation to Transit 
 
Diversification of supply is a major priority for Turkish energy policy. 4 However, despite 
being surrounded by gas-rich neighbors, Ankara has been unable to diversify its natural 
gas intake due to problems of capacity, infrastructure, conflict, and geopolitics (Austvik 
& Rzayeva, 2016; Umucu, Altunisik, & Kok, 2011).  
Russia’s rich reserves, geographical location, rapid development of pipeline 
systems, technical expertise and know-how make Russia the most important energy 
partner for Turkey. However, incidents that give the impression that Russia uses natural 
gas as a political weapon heighten fears about Turkish energy security (Nygren, 2008) 
and encourage efforts to diversify natural gas intake. Russia accounts for more than half 
of Turkey’s gas imports and this role is likely to increase after the completion of 
TurkStream, which guarantees direct access to Russian gas. 
When countries rely heavily on one country for their energy demand, they may 
also pursue contractual diversification – varying contracts in terms of companies and 
																																																								
4	Interview with İsmail Kürşad Çapanoğlu, Acting Vice Head of Department, International Projects, 




duration- to reduce associated risk (Balmaceda, 2013). In Turkey, the Natural Gas Market 
Law in 2001 was signed to liberalize the market. Accordingly, several private companies 
now import natural gas from the West line (Rzayeva, 2018). While this is a positive 
development for Turkey’s transit security, all companies (including BOTAŞ) have signed 
long-term contracts with Russia, which involve strict take-or-pay clauses. These clauses 
require importers to pay for an agreed quantity of natural gas regardless of their ability to 
actually take deliveries, which limits Turkey’s ability to improve its supply security 
(Rzayeva, 2018). 
Overall, these examples show how concerns about diversification and supply 
security can affect transit countries. At a first glance, Turkey’s proximity to rich natural 
gas reserves can be seen in a very positive light. Yet, Turkey’s ongoing heavy 
dependence on Russia for natural gas makes Ankara vulnerable not only as a consumer 
country, but also as a transit state. In fact, the major asymmetry in trade dependence– 
Russian gas is vital for Turkey’s economic growth, meanwhile Turkey is one of Russia’s 
many energy partners – may eventually constrain Ankara’s hand in becoming a transit 
hub for Caspian gas.  
Turkey’s Demand Security in Relation to Transit 
 
Transit security as defined in this paper requires stable and preferably increasing demand 
for gas in transit. For Turkey’s current and future transit fortunes, the EU is the main 
source of this demand. The natural gas is a major component of EU’s overall energy 
demand and many Central and Eastern European countries depend on stable deliveries 




The existence of a large market of natural gas at its western borders provides 
incentives for Turkey to increase its natural gas intake (Müftüler-Baç & Başkan, 2011). 
Especially, in the last two decades, Turkey has aspired to become a new corridor to 
Europe in order to satisfy the continent’s energy needs with natural gas from the Middle 
East and the Caspian. The potential Turkish route has been called the fourth corridor (the 
others being Russia, Norway and North Africa) and seen as an opportunity for the EU to 
diversify away from Russian gas after the supply crises of 2006 and 2009 (Bilgin, 2011; 
Roberts, 2003). The fourth corridor eventually came alive with the construction and 
completion of TANAP (Gürel & Mullen, 2014). TANAP and TAP establishes Turkey’s 
position as a contributor to Europe’s energy security and realizes Turkey’s long-term 
strategy as a reliable transit corridor (Richert, 2014).  
Overall, the existence of a strong EU demand is a major factor increasing 
Turkey’s transit security. At the moment, Turkey’s contribution to the overall EU energy 
mix is rather small. Furthermore, Turkey’s transit security could still be negatively 
affected by a decrease in European demand, and the EU’s ability to find other sources of 
natural gas and increase its LNG intake (Berk & Schulte, 2017; Roberts, 2003). Yet, as 
mentioned in the previous section, Turkey is now emerging as a key transit state for the 
EU not only for Caspian reserves but also for Russian gas via TurkStream. As such it 
acquires a unique strategic position in relation to EU as a transit country from two 
different sources. With the finalization of the TurkStream, Turkey and the EU are likely 
to establish an interdependent relationship in natural gas trade, which would strengthen 





Transit Security in Relation to Pipelines 
	
	
Preceding sections showed how transit countries often inherit the security concerns of 
both importers and exporters. Yet, pipeline transit also has its own prospects and 
challenges. First, pipeline projects appeal to potential transit countries due to their 
financial and strategic benefits including transit fees, easy access to gas, investment 
technology, potential partnership deals, and political influence once they are built 
(Bahgat, 2006). Especially for energy-poor countries, becoming a transit hub is attractive 
due to the existence of rents.  At the same time, building a new pipeline is costly and 
necessitates significant investment from all actors involved. Finally, pipeline relations are 
complicated by geopolitical factors that are intrinsic to transit.   
Pipeline Economics  
 
Pipeline projects are economic phenomena constrained by calculations such as 
profitability, long-term sustainability, and cost-effectiveness. As with any economic 
interaction involving more than two parties, transit relations can get complicated, 
particularly when rents have to be shared. 
Turkey is in an ideal geographical position to become a transit hub. However, 
Ankara has not substantially benefited from its transit potential due to contractual 
limitations and the urgency of satisfying its on growing demand.5 Therefore, unlike other 
energy-poor transit countries such as Ukraine and Belarus, Turkish government did not 
have access to transit rents. In the case of Turkey, hence, it was the prospect of future 
transit rents and the government’s associated policy to become a transit hub, which drove 
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its active energy diplomacy in the late 2000s (Bilgin, 2015). As such, economic interests 
in Ankara have played an important role in Turkey’s current transformation into a transit 
corridor.  
Two pipelines, TANAP and TurkStream, could be considered as a culmination of 
this energy diplomacy. TANAP helps Ankara diversify its energy sources. Furthermore, 
Turkey can sell any unused gas from Azerbaijan to third countries and become a natural 
gas exporter. This is because the sales and purchase agreement between BOTAŞ and 
Shah Deniz consortium does not contain a destination clause (Rzayeva, 2018). 
TurkStream realizes Turkey’s long-term goal of becoming a major transit partner to both 
Russia and the EU. These two developments strengthen Turkey’s transit security by 
increasing the amount of natural gas it can transit and allowing financial benefits in the 
form of re-exports and discounted prices in the longer term (Austvik & Rzayeva, 2016; 
Rzayeva, 2018).6  
In addition to rents, the uncertainty around the compensation of the transit country 
is one of the key economic reasons for conflictual transit relations (Stevens, 2009). In the 
context of Turkey’s transit security, the negotiation of the failed Nabucco pipeline is a 
good case in point. The Nabucco pipeline would have transferred gas from Turkmenistan 
to Europe under the Caspian Sea and through Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. Turkey’s 
demand to claim 15% of the gas at discounted prices either for domestic consumption or 
re-exporting was one of the main reasons that reduced the economic viability of the 
project for the investors (Traynor, 2009).  
																																																								
6	Ankara has expected Turkish companies to pay discounted prices for Russian gas delivered to the Turkish 
market via the new pipeline (Rzayeva, 2018). However, this is unlikely to happen before the contracts 




The literature on foreign direct investments indicates that the supply side has 
more leverage prior to the building of a pipeline. Evidently a pipeline without a dedicated 
energy source will be unfeasible and the supplier has the luxury of choosing from 
different transit routes, evaluating potential costs and benefits. Once the pipeline is built 
and operational, however, the transit country may acquire substantial leverage (Eden, 
Lenway, & Schuler, 2005). This process is explained by the concept of an obsolescing 
bargain (Vernon, 1971), where a company loses its bargaining power after having made a 
major investment. Accordingly, with the pipeline route already built and making 
supernatural profits, transit country would be aware that it would be very difficult for the 
supplier to seek an alternative route (Omonbude, 2016). Hence, the transit country will 
have incentives to charge higher transit tariffs; demand more offtake and re-export 
quotas, and divert pre-agreed transit gas for domestic use (Willems & Sul, 2008).  
While useful in terms of understanding shifting incentives, the concept of 
obsolescing bargain has to be qualified, especially when applied to commerce in energy. 
Many transit countries also import energy from the same source. If transit countries push 
too far, exporters can stop gas flows and invest in economically more sound alternatives 
(Willems & Sul, 2008). This is especially relevant for Eurasia, where Russia is in a 
position to diversify its export routes if transit countries become economic liabilities. 
Hence, the existence of multiple routes from a single supplier is likely to reduce leverage 
of transit countries. With multiple routes production can be allocated to transit countries 
that have good relations with the supplier (Woehrel, 2010). This explains Russia’s 





Pipeline Politics  
 
Energy security is a strategic priority for all nation states; hence it invites a substantial 
role for governments to play, especially regarding pipeline politics. Pipeline politics 
signify a process where producers, transit countries, and importers engage in strategic 
competition to increase their energy security based on their respective interests and 
priorities. This process inevitably implies geopolitics (Öge, 2015). In certain cases, such 
as Ukraine’s future transit status, geopolitical influences (e.g. Russia’s annexation of 
Crimea) are blatant. Apart from open military conflict, however, the broader geopolitical 
context can also have a huge impact on the prospects of existing and future pipeline 
projects. 
Particularly in Eurasia, the competition of the OECD countries with Russia, 
China, and Iran has had a direct influence on the success and failure of proposed 
pipelines. From the late 1990s onwards, the United States and the European Union have 
eagerly lobbied for the Nabucco project. Due to ongoing economic sanctions against 
Tehran, Washington firmly rejected any gas route that involved Iran even if it was 
financially the most logical one to bring Caspian gas to Europe. Instead, Washington 
lobbied for pipelines that passed through the territory of its ally Turkey (Hancock, 2006, 
p. 76; Lubin, 1999, p. 63; Traynor, 2009). 
Interestingly, despite the political support from Western countries, the Nabucco 
project failed due to questions about financial feasibility, limited supply commitments 
from Caspian countries, and Russia’s opposition. In fact, until the construction of the 




been successful to prevent its competitors from securing access to the European market 
by offering sticks and carrots to transit countries such as Ukraine, Georgia, and Turkey. 
As seen in the example of Nabucco, geopolitics has had a major impact on 
Turkey’ transit security in a relatively turbulent geographical region with substantial 
resources and lucrative markets (Bilgin, 2015). Russia has been Turkey’s biggest trade 
partner in natural gas, however, until recently, Ankara did not have friendly political 
relations with Moscow. Turkey-Russia relations have warmed up in the last few years in 
the context of Turkey’s changing foreign policy (Öniş & Yılmaz, 2016). However, the 
brief cancellation of TurkStream by Moscow after Turkey shot down a Russian jet in 
Syria is a good indicator of how geopolitics can still impact Turkey’s transit security. At 
the moment, Turkey’s future transit security relies heavily on maintaining good relations 
with Russia, its biggest supplier, and Turkey remains vulnerable to foreign policy 
changes in a very turbulent region.  
Geopolitics can also affect future natural gas transit opportunities for Turkey 
including from Iran, Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), and Eastern Mediterranean 
(Berk & Schulte, 2017). However, reinstated US sanctions against Iran, Turkey’s 
ongoing conflict with the PKK (Kurdistan’s Workers’ Party), and Ankara’s frosty 
relations with Cyprus and Israel make these potential natural gas sources unlikely targets 
for Turkey in the short run. 
Power asymmetries and political conflict can thus have a direct influence on a 
country’s transit security. However, this does not necessarily have to be negative. 
Turkey’s energy relations with Azerbaijan hugely benefit from the geopolitical and 




gas from Azerbaijan makes a major contribution to Turkey’s transit security. Contrary to 
Russia and Iran, Azerbaijan remains Turkey’s “only natural gas supplier that was not 
involved in a serious price dispute with BOTAŞ or subject to other political or 
geopolitical tensions” (Rzayeva, 2018).  
Overall, Turkey’s aspirations to become a transit hub are fundamentally affected 
by its transit security, which is in turn determined by asymmetries in trade dependence 
and political power in addition to Turkey’s domestic interests in favor of becoming a 
transit corridor. Interestingly, the key dilemma for Turkey’s current policy makers is that 
their ambition to become a transit hub could in the end increase Turkey’s dependence on 
Russia. Pipeline projects rely on firm commitments from suppliers, without which 
pursuing an ambitious transit strategy becomes extremely difficult. For example, In 
2000s, Turkey’s goal of channeling Caspian gas to Europe mostly failed due to lack of 
commitment from suppliers such as Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan (Bilgin, 2011; 
Tiftikçigil & Yesevi, 2014). At the moment, with the exception of Azerbaijan, Turkey’s 
only realistic additional supply source remains Russia, which gives Moscow an 
asymmetrical advantage over Ankara.7 The next section evaluates the successes and 
failures of pipeline projects in Eurasia based on the definition of transit security 




7	Interview with Ercan Kılınçkıran. Branch Manager, The Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources. 




Transit Security in Practice: Success and Failure of Natural 
Gas Pipeline Projects in Eurasia 
 
The preceding section defined transit security as a complex phenomenon overlapping 
with both supply and demand security, as well as having its own economic and 
geopolitical dynamics underlined by asymmetries in trade and political power as well as 
domestic interests. This section will operationalize the concept of transit security and 
apply it to five major natural gas pipelines in Eurasia to further demonstrate its 
explanatory value. In cases where the dynamics of the pipeline projects align with the 
components of transit security described above, the pipelines will have a higher 
likelihood of success. However, in cases where pipeline projects conflict with these 
components, the outcome is more likely to be negative.   
Table 1 lists selected Eurasian natural gas pipelines that include transit countries. 
It shows that in cancelled pipeline projects (Nabucco and South Stream) problems of 
demand, supply and transit (pipeline economics and geopolitics) were prominent. For 
example, in the case of Nabucco, both supply and demand were feeble. In terms of 
supply, only Azerbaijan firmly committed natural gas to the project while Kazakhstan 
and Turkmenistan declined to do so. At the same time, the European demand was weak 
due to the economic recession of 2008. Nabucco also suffered from complications 
specific to the pipeline project itself. For instance Turkey’s demands to re-export 15 
percent of its offtake and the high costs of building the pipeline slowed down the whole 
process. In terms of geopolitics, while the United States was strongly in favor of the 
project, Russia was determinedly against it and put forward South Stream to undermine 




transit security were overwhelmingly against the completion of this project, which was 
eventually canceled. This outcome was a major blow to Turkey’s transit aspirations at the 
time.  
[Table 1 here] 
South Stream would have transferred Russian gas to Bulgaria under the Black Sea 
eventually terminating in Austria, making Bulgaria, Serbia, Slovenia and Hungary transit 
countries. In discussions of South Stream in the EU, fears about asymmetrical gas trade 
with Russia were prominent, which highlighted the challenge Moscow posed to the 
supply security of Europe. Importantly, the Russian proposal for South Stream also failed 
to conform to the new EU stance on the issue of transit, which necessitated third-party 
access, tariff regulation, ownership bundling and transparency (Stratfor, 2015). This 
policy makes it difficult for new pipelines to be built and consequently prioritizes LNG, 
which can help the EU diversify away from Russian gas (Yafimava, 2018). These issues 
were compounded by Russia’s annexation of Crimea and Gazprom’s demands for 
preferential treatment. Again, these components of transit security as defined in this paper 
explain why the pipeline project was eventually canceled (Richard, 2015).  
Russia is currently in the process of replacing its Ukrainian route (The Ukranian 
and Yamal-Europe pipelines) with alternative pipeline projects such as TurkStream and 
Nord Stream 2 following its economic, political and military disputes with Ukraine. 
These plans to divert natural gas from the traditional Ukraine route after 2019 will have 
major implications for many countries in the region (Pirani & Yafimava, 2016). Several 
factors related to transit security contributed to this outcome. First, the unreliability of 




and demand security and these concerns were reflected in the proposals for Nord Stream 
2. These concerns emerged from chronic pipeline disputes between Moscow and Kiev, 
which culminated in shortages in some EU countries. Finally, in the aftermath of the 
ongoing state of war between Russia and Ukraine, assymetries in trade and political 
power in favor of Russia allowed Moscow to  diversify away from the Ukrainian route.   
The components of transit security as lined out in this paper also explain why 
certain pipeline projects were successful. The Southern Gas Corridor extends from 
Azerbaijan through Turkey to Greece, Albania and Italy, is slated to transport natural gas 
from the Caspian Sea to the EU. The corridor includes TANAP and TAP, which is 
expected to be operational by 2020. Both TANAP and TAP benefited significantly from 
the EU’s urge to diversify its natural gas intake away from Russia. The project gives 
significant economic incentives to the Turkish government in the form of re-export 
options and is politically supported by both the United States and Europe (O'Bryne, 
2011). In addition, political affinity between Turkey and Azerbaijan was a major factor in 
the success of TANAP. Overall, the success of the Southern Gas Corridor is partly due to 
its alignment with Turkey’s priorities in transit security. 
Finally, TurkStream was proposed to Turkey by Russia as South Stream 
negotiations collapsed. In that sense, Russia’s eagerness to bypass the Ukraine route was 
also a key motivator for TurkStream. There was also a strong interest from South Eastern 
European countries as it had become clear that the Ukraine route was not viable for 
Russia anymore. Similar to the Southern Gas Corridor, TurkStream lines up with 
components of Turkey’s transit security. It provides substantial potential economic 




regulations on gas trade. Finally, the geopolitical context was also a major precipitator for 
TurkStream. Particularly, Turkey’s deteriorating relations with the West and warming 
relations with Russia facilitated the project (Ahval, 2018). 
Conclusion 
 
The complexity of energy security requires a broad treatment of the concept that includes 
a whole range of activities from the producer to the consumer. As a pioneer study, this 
paper makes a significant contribution to the theory of energy security by defining and 
operationalizing transit security. Transit takes place in substantial amounts everyday, yet 
interestingly transit security remains a vastly understudied concept. Rather than focusing 
transit relations outside of their global context, this paper takes a holistic view to analyze 
how transit security is conditioned by different sets of factors that relate to energy 
security. As such, this paper defines transit security broadly where transit countries are 
sensible to changes in both supply and demand security, in addition to transit-specific 
issues, which are determined by economic and geopolitical factors. Defined as such, the 
paper argued that transit security is heavily influenced by asymmetries in trade 
dependence and political power as well as domestic interests in favor of acquiring transit 
rents.   
This paper focused on Turkey as an emerging transit power in a region where 
trade in natural gas is a major strategic concern for all parties concerned. In recent years, 
new pipeline projects from Azerbaijan and Russia had a positive impact on Turkey’s 




Moscow can still undermine Turkey’s future as a transit hub for European natural gas 
demand.  
Additionally, the concept of transit security in this paper is useful in explaining 
how future pipeline projects are either canceled or built and how existing pipelines are 
either sustained or abandoned. Eurasia is notorious for pipeline politics where states 
compete to secure access to energy, diversify their sources, host new pipelines, and 
prevent market access to their competitors. In certain cases, the competition between 
importers, transit states, and exporters led to the failure of proposed pipeline projects. In 
others, components of transit security described here actually facilitated progress. Future 
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